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I. Introduction 
As in most fields of the law, the law pertaining to real prop-
erty security transactions is continually evolving. l That evolv-
ing process is highlighted by the current trend of the California 
Supreme Court allowing the parties, at the inception of their 
transaction, to freely elect the true nature of the transaction~ 
and thereafter be bound by that election. At the inception 
of a security transaction, the true nature of that transaction 
is limited only by the imagination and relative bargaining 
positions of the parties. In determining this true nature, the 
court will look to substance rather than form. Once the true 
nature is established, the rights, duties, and obligations of 
the parties are determined by the applicable law. 
1. For a thorough and complete re- land, California Real Estate Secured 
view and analysis of California real Transactions, Cal. C.E.B. (1970). 
property security transactions, see Het-
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II. Antideficiency Legislation 
A. In General 
The prohibition or limitation on the personal liability of a 
debtor in a real property security transaction is determined by 
applying the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure sections 
580b,2 580d,3 and 7264 to the facts of each particular case.5 
2. Code of Civ. Proc. section 580b 
provides as follows: 
"No deficiency judgment shall lie in 
any event after any sale of real proper-
ty for failure of the purchaser to com-
plete his contract of sale, or under a 
deed of trust, or mortgage, given to the 
vendor to secure payment of the bal-
ance of the purchase price of real prop-
erty, or under a deed of trust, or mort-
gage, on a dwelling for not more than 
four families given to a lender to 
secure repayment of a loan which was 
ill fact used to pay all or part of the 
purchase price of such dwelling occu-
pied, entirely or in part, by the pur-
chaser." (Italicized portions added by 
1963 amendment.) 
3. Code of Civ. Proc. section 580d 
provides, in part: 
"No judgment shall be rendered for 
any deficiency upon a note secured by 
a deed of trust or mortgage upon real 
property hereafter executed in any case 
in which the real property has been 
sold by the mortgagee or trustee under 
power of sale contained in such mort-
gage or deed of trust." 
4. Code of Civ. Proc. section 726 
provides in part: 
"There can be but one form of action 
for the recovery of any debt, or the en-
forcement of any right secured by mort-
gage upon real property, which action 
must be in accordance with the provi-
sions of this chapter . . . . The de-
cree for the foreclosure of a mortgage 
or deed of trust secured by real prop-
erty or any interest therein shall declare 
CAL LAW 1970 
the amount of the indebtedness or right 
so secured and, unless judgment for any 
deficiency there may be between the 
sale price and the amount due with 
costs is waived by the judgment cred-
itor or a deficiency judgment is prohib-
ited by Section 580b, shall determine 
the personal liability of any defendant 
for the payment of the debt secured by 
such mortgage or deed of trust and shall 
name such defendants against whom a 
deficiency judgment may be ordered fol-
lowing the proceedings hereinafter pre-
scribed. In the event of such waiver, 
or if the prohibition of Section 580b is 
applicable the decree shall so declare 
and there shall be no judgment for a 
deficiency. In the event that a de-
ficiency is not waived or prohibited and 
it is decreed that any defendant is per-
sonally liable for such debt, then upon 
application of the plaintiff filed at any 
time within three months of the date of 
the foreclosure sale and after a hearing 
thereon at which the court shall take 
evidence and at which hearing either 
party may present evidence as to the 
fair value of the property or the inter-
est therein sold as of the date of sale, 
the court shall render a money judg-
ment against such defendant or defend-
ants for the amount by which the 
amount of the indebtedness with inter-
est and costs of sale and of action ex-
ceeds the fair value of the property or 
interest therein sold as of the date of 
sale; provided, however, that in no 
event shall the amount of said judg-
ment, exclusive of interest from the 
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B. Purchase Money Antideficiency Protection: Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 58Gb 
Prior to the 1963 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure 
section 580b, the identity of the person furnishing the "pur-
chase money" was immateria1.6 No distinction was made be-
tween a vendor and a third-party lender. In either case, the 
person furnishing all or any part of the purchase price and 
taking a note secured by a deed of trust, mortgage, or contract 
of sale on the purchased property could not get a deficiency 
judgment against the purchaser. 
With the enactment of the 1963 amendment to section 
580b, the identity of the person furnishing the purchase money 
became material, as did the character of the purchased prop-
erty. Section 580b, as it now reads, does not change the result 
as to a lender of purchase money for residential property as 
defined by section 580b or as to a vendor. However, all other 
third-party lenders are not subject to the provisions of section 
580b. 
1. Distinction Between Lender and Vendor 
In Kistler v. Vasi,7 the plaintiffs were real estate brokers 
who took a note from the defendants in 1965, as part of their 
commission. The note was secured by a second deed of trust 
on the unimproved property purchased by the defendants. A 
sale under the first deed of trust wiped out the plaintiffs' secu-
rity, and they commenced this action to recover on the note. 
The Court held that plaintiffs were "lenders" under the amend-
ed section 580b, and were therefore not precluded from re-
covering a deficiency judgment. 
difference between the amount for 
which the property was sold and the en-
tire amount of the indebtedness secured 
by said mortgage or deed of trust 
" 
5. Code of Civ. Proc. section 580a, 
allowing deficiency judgments following 
sale under the power contained in a 
deed of trust, is no longer effective in 
light of Code of Civ. Proc. section 
424 
580d. See also Roseleaf Corp. v. 
Chierighino, 59 Ca1.2d 35, 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 873, 378 P.2d 97 (1963). 
6. Bargioni v. Hill, 59 Cal.2d 121, 28 
Cal. Rptr. 321, 378 P.2d 593 (1963). 
7. 71 Cal.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 170, 
455 P.2d 106 (1969). For a further dis-
cussion of this case, see Bernhardt, 
REAL PROPERTY, and YORK, REMEDIES, 
in this volume. 
CAL LAW 1970 
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This case is important not only for the actual decision, but 
also for establishing the framework in which to analyze the 
applicability of section 580b. The Court stated as follows. s 
[U]nder the plain language of the 1963 amendment 
to section 580b plaintiffs are lenders and not vendors. 
The amendment expressly distinguishes between lenders 
of purchase money and vendors and contemplates that 
the parties to a sale of real property, other than the de-
fined residential property, may freely elect to arrange for 
the financing of the purchase price in ways that may 
wholly or in part limit the vendee's protection from de-
ficiency judgments. If the parties wish to afford full 
protection to the vendee, they may provide that all secur-
ity instruments be given to the vendor, in which case sub-
sequent assignees from the vendor would take subject 
to section 580b. If the vendor is not willing to accept 
such extensive risks, however, he may insist that all or 
part of the purchase price be financed by third parties, 
whose remedies are not affected by section 580b. More-
over, in such a case it is immaterial whether the third 
party who assists in the financing makes a payment of 
part of the price to the vendor in exchange for the ven-
dee's note and deed of trust or, as in this case, discharges 
an existing obligation of the vendor in exchange for the 
vendee's note and deed of trust.9 
Two months prior to the California Supreme Court decision 
in Kistler v. Vasi, the Court of Appeals decided Jackson v. 
Taylor. 10 Here again, the issue before the Court was whether 
a sold-out junior was a "vendor" or "lender" within the amend-
ed section 580b. In Jackson, the plaintiffs, in 1961, sold un-
improved real property to Rodens, and, as part of the purchase 
8. 71 Ca1.2d -, -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
170, 171-172, 455 P.2d 106, 107-108. 
9. Suppose the real estate brokers in 
Kistler had previously assigned their 
note and deed of trust to the vendors of 
the property, who then commenced the 
action against the vendee. Would sec-
CAL LAW 1970 
tion 580b then preclude a deficiency 
judgment? 
10. 272 Cal App.2d 1, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
891 (1969). For a further discussion 
of this case, see Rohwer, CONTRACTS, 
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price, took back a note and deed of trust on the purchased 
property. The deed of trust was subsequently subordinated 
when Rodens constructed seven rental dwelling units on the 
purchased property. In 1965, Rodens sold the property to 
the defendants, and, as part of the transaction, plaintiffs sur-
rendered the Rodens' note and deed of trust in return for a new 
note from the defendants secured by a second deed of trust on 
the same property. A sale under the first deed of trust wiped 
out the plaintiffs' security, and they instituted this action on 
the note. The Court held that plaintiffs were "vendors" as 
to the defendants, and thereby were precluded from recover-
ing a deficiency judgment. The Court stated: 
When the 1965 transaction involved herein is analyzed, 
it is clear that, even though the Rodens were the legal 
owners of the property, plaintiffs also were necessary 
parties in the transfer of the property to defendants and 
that, by consenting to, and participating in the sale of the 
property to defendants, plaintiffs were vendors of their 
interest as beneficiaries under the original trust deed. 
Moreover, it is clear that the 1965 note and trust deed 
were given by defendants to plaintiffs as 'a necessary part 
of the purchase price of the property'. For these reasons 
we must conclude that plaintiffs were vendors with re-
spect to the 1965 purchase which brings the 1965 note 
and trust deed within provisions of section 580b as 
amended. l1 
Jackson cannot be reconciled with Kistler. In Jackson, the 
plaintiffs were "vendors" of the property as to Rodens, but 
not as to defendants. Under Kistler, the applicability of sec-
tion 580b is determined by its "plain language." If section 
580b were intended to preclude a prior vendor from obtaining 
a deficiency judgment against a subsequent purchaser, the 
statute would have read "to a vendor" and not, as actually 
written, "to the vendor." Also, the reference to "vendor" un-
der section 580b must, of necessity, refer to a seller of real 
11. 272 Cal. App.2d 1, 6-7, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 891, 894-895. 
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property. The holder of a beneficial interest under a deed of 
trust holds personal property and not real property. 
Under the amended section 580b, the relationship of the 
parties, each as to the other, must be analyzed. For example, 
if A sells nonresidential property to B, and, as part of the pur-
chase price, A takes back a promissory note secured by a deed 
of trust on the purchased property, A is a "vendor" as to B. 
However, if B then sells the property to C, who either assumes 
A's note and deed of trust or issues a new note and deed of 
trust to A, A would be a "lender" as to C. 
Kincaid v. Gomez12 demonstrates that the Court will look 
to the substance of the transaction in determining the appli-
cability of section 580b. In this case, plaintiff agreed to sell 
real property to "Gomez and/or Nominee," and take back, as 
part of the purchase price, a note secured by a second deed of 
trust on the purchased property. Title to the property was 
taken by the nominee, Dolphin Construction Company. A 
note was signed by Gomez, Magliocco, and Dolphin Construc-
tion Company. Dolphin executed the deed of trust securing 
the note. A sale under the first deed of trust wiped out plain-
tiff's security. Plaintiff, being a sold-out junior, then sued 
Gomez and Magliocco to recover on the note. It was stipulat-
ed at trial that Gomez and Magliocco were the actual purchas-
ers of the property. The Court held that plaintiff was a 
"vendor" and that section 580b, therefore, precluded him 
from obtaining a deficiency judgment against Gomez and 
Magliocco. It was argued that section 580b was inapplicable, 
since Gomez and Magliocco did not execute the deed of trust, 
but the Court rejected the argument, stating: 
The fact that the deed of trust was executed by the cor-
poration only, for it alone held title, does not mean that 
the note was unsecured on respondents' part, thereby 
rendering them liable to a personal judgment. Taking 
the transaction as a whole, and considering that it was 
contemplated from the beginning that there would be a 
12. 274 Cal. App.2d -,79 Cal. Rptr. ERTY, and YORK, REMEDIES, in this vol-
539 (1969). For a further discussion ume. 
of this case, see Bernhardt, REAL PROP-
CA L LA W 1970 427 
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nominee, that Dolphin Construction Company was the 
sole nominee, and that the note expressly says that it is 
secured by a deed of trust, we regard the transaction, as 
the trial judge did, as a single one.I3 
2. "Sold-Out J unior"14 
In 1953, Brown v. JensenI6 held that section 580b precluded 
a sold-out junior of purchase-money security from obtaining 
a deficiency judgment. Subsequently, in 1963, Roseleat 
Corp. v. Chierighino and Bargioni v. Hill left reason to believe 
that Brown v. Jensen was no longer the law with respect to 
sold-out juniors of purchase-money security.I6 
Kistler has apparently reaffirmed Brown v. Jensen. Kistler 
not only cited Brown favorably, but it observed that if the par-
ties had chosen another method for the payment of plaintiffs' 
commission, the defendants would have been afforded the 
protection of section 580b. Since the most likely alternative 
method would have been for the defendants to give a note and 
deed of trust to the vendors, who in turn would have assigned 
it to the plaintiffs, and since the plaintiffs were, in fact, sold-out 
juniors, the reasoning is that a sold-out junior would still be 
precluded by section 580b from recovering a deficiency judg-
ment. 
California Court of Appeals decisions in Kincaid v. Gomez, 
supra, and Jackson v. Taylor, supra, have held that section 
580b bars a sold-out junior of purchase-money security from 
obtaining a deficiency judgment. 
3. What Constitutes the "Purchase Price"? 
In Pond v. Schwartz,17 the defendant conveyed an undivided 
one-half interest in real property to the plaintiffs. The plain-
13. 274 Cal. App.2d -, -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 539, 540-541. 
14. A "sold-out junior" is the hold-
er of a junior deed of trust or mortgage 
whose security has been wiped out by 
a judicial or nonjudicial sale under a 
senior deed of trust or mortgage. 
428 
15. 41 Cal.2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 
(1953). 
16. See Hetland, Deficiency Judg-
ment Limitations in California-A 
New Judicial Approach, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 
1 at 11 (1963). 
17. 268 Cal. App.2d 572, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 353 (1968). 
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tiffs agreed (1) to execute a $30,000 note secured by a deed 
of trust on the purchased undivided one-half interest and 
(2) that their undivided one-half interest in the property 
"is to be deemed security for any losses suffered" by defend-
ant in an unrelated transaction. The Court affirmed the trial 
court's holding that the agreement between the parties was that 
the "purchase price" was $30,000 plus the loss suffered by 
the defendant in the unrelated transaction, and that the de-
fendant was precluded by section 580b from obtaining a de-
ficiency judgment against the plaintiffs.18 
The Court's conclusion in Pond that the two obligations 
(one of which carried no promise to pay) constituted the "pur-
chase price" for the undivided one-half interest demonstrates 
the amount of care that must be taken in setting up any such 
transaction to avoid having the "purchase price" include more 
than the parties anticipate. 
III. Guarantors and Sureties 
In situations involving a guarantor of a secured obligation, 
the analysis of any particular transaction will encompass one 
or more of the following areas: (a) The nature and extent 
of the guaranty; (b) The rights, duties, and obligations of the 
guarantor and of the secured creditor, as to each other; (c) 
Whether the guarantor has waived, or is estopped from assert-
ing, his rights against the secured creditor; (d) The rights, 
duties, and obligations of the guarantor and of the secured 
debtor, as to each other; and (e) The effect of the antidefi-
ciency legislation. 
18. The purchase agreement in ques-
tion was executed on June 23, 1960, 
and when the Court referred to the ap-
plicability of section 580b, 268 Cal. 
App.2d 572, 580, 74 Cal. Rptr. 353, 
358, it sets forth section 580b, as 
amended in 1963. Inasmuch as the 
same result would follow under section 
580b before it was amended, the refer-
CAL LAW 1970 
ence to the amended section 580b is 
probably an oversight by the Court, and 
should not br relied on as indicating the 
amendment to be retroactive. See Civ. 
Code section 3 and Code of Civ. Proc. 
section 3, stating that provisions of 
codes are not retroactive unless express-
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A. Nature and Extent of the Guaranty 
In Roberts v. Graves,19 Meadowbrook Developers, Inc. pur-
chased real property from Roberts, and, as part of the pur-
chase price, executed a $33,000 promissory note secured by a 
second deed of trust on the purchased property. Graves 
signed the note "individually and as Co-guarantor." Extrinsic 
evidence, developed at the trial, showed that Graves knew 
Roberts would be hypothecating the note and deed of trust 
to a bank in order to borrow $16,500, and that the bank 
would not make the loan to Roberts unless Graves personally 
guaranteed the purchase-money note. A sale under the first 
deed of trust wiped out the security of Roberts, who then com-
menced this action against Graves as a guarantor. The Court 
held that Graves only guaranteed the note to the extent of the 
$16,500 borrowed from the bank, and further held that section 
580b does not protect a guarantor of purchase-money se-
curity. 
A "dragnet" or "omnibus" clause in a guaranty agreement 
provides that the guaranty encompasses all sums of money that 
the creditor has previously loaned, or that the creditor sub-
sequently loans, to the debtor. A similar clause in a deed of 
trust provides that the deed of trust is given to secure the pay-
ment of all moneys now and hereafter due or owing from 
the trustor to the beneficiary. 
In Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. Glynn,20 defendant Glynn, an 
attorney experienced in financial affairs, executed a guaranty 
containing a "dragnet" clause in favor of the bank. Prior 
to the execution of the guaranty, the bank had made two loans 
to the debtor. The bank sued Glynn on the guaranty for the 
amount of the two earlier loans. The Court held Glynn liable 
on the guaranty for the two notes executed by the debtor prior 
to Glynn's execution of the guaranty, and stated that "the 
language patently put him on notice that there had been earlier 
loans." 
19. 269 Cal. App.2d 410, 75 Cal. 20. 267 Cal. App.2d 859, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 130 (1969). Rptr. 808 (1968); modified 268 ACA 
612, 73 Cal. Rptr. 808. 
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Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. Glynn, supra, should be com-
pared with Gates v. Crocker-Anglo Nat. Bank/ wherein the 
Court held a dragnet clause in a deed of trust inapplicable 
to one of the co-trustors for a prior unsecured loan made by the 
bank to the other co-trustor. The Court reasoned that plain-
tiff, being totally unaware of the prior unsecured loan, presum-
ably would not have executed the deed of trust had he known 
that the dragnet clause contained therein would render him 
liable as a surety for his cotenant's individual debt. 
In essence, the Beverly Hills Nat. Bank v. Glynn case holds 
that a dragnet clause imparts at least constructive notice to 
the guarantor of the existence of prior loans, whereas the 
Gates v. Crocker-Anglo Nat. Bank case holds to the contrary. 
Because of the differing approaches used by the Courts in 
analyzing the applicability of dragnet clauses, the creditor 
should tell the guarantor or co-trustor of any prior loans it 
made to the debtor, and, correspondingly the guarantor or 
co-trustor should ask the creditor about the existence of any 
prior loans made to the debtor. 
The dragnet clause raises issues regarding two separate 
notes or debts secured by a single deed of trust on real prop-
erty. Issues yet to be decided are: 
( 1) If the secured creditor holds a sale under the power 
on only one of the notes, does section 580d preclude a de-
ficiency judgment on the second note, and, if not, does the 
secured creditor have the uncontrolled discretion as to which 
note he treats as secured and which note unsecured? 
(2) If the secured creditor brings a judicial foreclosure 
action on one of the notes, does Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 726 limit or preclude a deficiency judgment on the second 
note, or, if the creditor first obtains a personal judgment on 
one of the notes, has he then waived his security for the second 
note, and possibly waived the debt itse1f?2 
1. 257 Cal. App.2d 857, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 536 (1968). 
2. For discussion on section 580d 
"note" and section 726 "debt," see Het-
land, Deficiency Judgment Limitations 
in California-A New Judicial Ap-
CAL LAW 1970 
proach, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1963); see 
also Gates v. Schuster, 227 Cal. App.2d 
287, 38 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1964) and 
Loretz v. Cal-Coast Dev. Corp., 249 
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B. Rights, Duties, and Obligations of the Guarantor and 
of the Secured Creditor, as to Each Other 
In Sumitomo Bank of Cal. v. Iwasaki,3 the California Su-
preme Court held that a creditor has a duty to disclose facts 
it knows about the debtor to the guarantor if (a) the creditor 
has reason to believe that those facts materially increase the 
risk beyond that which the guarantor intends to assume, (b) 
the creditor has reason to believe that the facts are unknown 
to the guarantor, and (c) the creditor has a reasonable oppor-
tunity to communicate the facts to the guarantor. If the guar-
antor establishes all of the above conditions, he will be dis-
charged from liability to the creditor. 
In Union Bank v. Brummell,4 Brummel guaranteed a non-
purchase-money secured note to Union Bank. The bank held 
a nonjudicial sale, bid in less than the secured obligation, and 
commenced this action to recover the deficiency against Brum-
mell on his guaranty. The Court, relying on Union Bank v. 
Gradsky,5 held that the bank, by holding the nonjudicial sale, 
had exercised an election of remedies that destroyed Brum-
mell's subrogation rights against the principal debtor, and that 
it was thereby precluded from recovering the deficiency from 
the guarantor. 
Thus, a secured creditor whose obligations are guaranteed 
has three remedies from which to choose: ( 1) He may bring 
a judicial foreclosure action, joining both the debtor and the 
guarantor; (2) he may sue the guarantor on the guaranty for 
the full amount of the unpaid balance of the principal obliga-
tion without proceeding against the debtor or the security; or 
(3) he may realize on the security by way of a nonjudicial 
sale. If the creditor elects to use the nonjudicial sale (Union 
Bank v. Brummell) and thereby terminates the guarantor's 
rights against either the security or the principal debtor, he will 
be precluded from recovering the deficiency from the guar-
antor. 
3. 70 Cal.2d 81, 73 Cal. Rptr. 564, 4. 269 Cal. App.2d 836, 75 Cal. 
447 P.2d 956 (1968). For a further Rptr. 234 (1969). 
discussion of this case, see Rohwer,S. 265 Cal. App.2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
CONTRACTS, in this volume. 64 (1968). 
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The reviewing Courts have not yet decided whether a se-
cured creditor of a purchase-money obligation (as opposed to 
a nonpurchase-money obligation, as in Union Bank v. Brum-
mell) , after holding a nonjudicial sale and bidding in less than 
the full amount of the principal obligation, can proceed 
against the guarantor for the deficiency. A logical extension 
of the Union Bank v. Brummell decision would seem to pre-
clude the secured creditor from pursuing the guarantor after 
holding a nonjudicial sale. In a nonpurchase-money situa-
tion such as Union Bank v. Brummell, the guarantor's subroga-
tion rights would allow him to obtain a deficiency judgment 
against the debtor if the secured obligation exceeds the fair 
market value of the secured property on the date of the 
judicial foreclosure sale, and then only to the amount 
of the excess.6 There was no discussion as to the fair 
market value of the secured property in Union Bank v. 
Brummell, and, accordingly, it cannot be determined wheth-
er a deficiency judgment could have been obtained against the 
debtor. However, whether a deficiency judgment would lie 
or not, the guarantor, upon payment to the secured creditor, 
would have been subrogated to the security. In a situation 
involving a guarantor of a purchase-money obligation, there 
would be no possibility of a deficiency judgment, but the 
guarantor would have a right to be subrogated to the security. 
C. Whether Guarantor Has Waived, or Is Estopped 
From Asserting, His Rights Against the Secured 
Creditor 
In Wiener v. Van Winkle,7 the Court held that the defend-
ant guarantor could, and did, waive Civil Code section 2845 
(right of guarantor to require creditor to proceed against the 
principal, or to pursue any other remedy in his power that 
the guarantor cannot himself pursue and that would lighten 
his burden) and section 2849 (guarantor is entitled to benefit 
of security held by the creditor). 
6. Code of Civ. Proc. § 726. of this case, see McCalI, COMMERCIAL 
7. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. TRANSACTIONS, in this volume. 
761 (1969). For a further discussion 
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Both Union Bank v. Grady and Union Bank v. Brummell 
stated that a guarantor can waive his defense to the creditor's 
action to recover a deficiency judgment after a nonjudicial 
sale, but that the defense had not been waived in those par-
ticular cases. 
D. Effects of Antideficiency Legislation 
Roberts v. Graves, supra, held that a guarantor of a pur-
chase-money secured obligation is not entitled to section 58Gb 
protection. 
IV. Vendor's Lien 
Civil Code section 3046, provides that one who sells real 
property has a vendor's lien thereon, independent of posses-
sion, for so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured 
otherwise than by the personal obligation of the buyer. 
Civil Code section 3048, provides that a vendor's lien is 
valid against everyone claiming under the debtor, except a 
purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for value. 
In Valley Vista Land Co. v. Nipomo Water & Sewer Co.,s 
Valley Vista conveyed land to Nipomo, and the latter agreed 
to install certain water and sewer facilities on other land owned 
by Valley Vista. Nipomo failed to make the installations. 
Nipomo then executed a deed of trust to its creditors, who took 
without knowledge of Valley Vista's rights. The Court held 
that Valley Vista had a vendor's lien (the amount thereof 
being equal to the fair market value of the land conveyed by 
Valley Vista, which was presumed to be the value of the serv-
ices and facilities promised by Nipomo), but that the vendor's 
lien was not valid against the creditors. It further held that 
the creditors were encumbrancers in good faith and for value 
within the meaning of Civil Code section 3048. 
The advantage of a vendor's lien is that the vendor can 
elect to either sue on the unsecured note without any "one 
form of action" or anti deficiency limitations, or, alternatively, 
8. 266 Cal. App.2d 331, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 181 (1968). 
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can foreclose his vendor's lien.9 However, a major drawback 
to relying on a vendor's lien is that the lien will be invalid as 
against a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer for value 
who takes without actual or constructive notice of the lien. 
One possible solution to the problem is to record the deposit 
receipt or agreement of sale, prior to the sale, designating 
therein that the seller is taking an unsecured promissory note 
from the buyer as part of the purchase price (being careful not 
to inadvertently create a mortgage by the use of any security 
language) . This should preclude any subsequent purchaser 
or encumbrancer from claiming "good faith" because con-
structive knowledge of the vendor's lien will be imparted to 
him due to the recordation of the deposit receipt or agreement 
of sale. 
Two practical problems, as yet undecided by the reviewing 
Courts, relate to the rights of a holder of a venQor's lien to rein-
state a prior deed of trust or mortgage and to redeem from a 
prior deed of trust or mortgage. 
Almost all secured promissory notes contain a provision 
that the holder thereof has the right to declare all sums imme-
diately due and payable on any default under the note and/or 
deed of trust. Civil Code section 2924c, limits the right to 
accelerate full payment of the secured obligation, and provides 
that "the trustor or mortgagor or his successor in interest 
. . or any other person having a subordinate lien or en-
cumbrance of record" has the right to cure an existing default 
on payment of only the delinquent installments plus certain 
charges. Since the holder of a vendor's lien does not have a 
"subordinate lien or encumbrance of record," it could be 
argued that he is not entitled to reinstate a prior mortgage 
or deed of trust. However, since Civil Code section 2924c 
allows reinstatement by a junior encumbrancer "of record," 
this same section may allow for reinstatement by the holder of 
a vendor's lien if the deposit receipt or agreement of sale, 
9. See Hetland, Deficiency Judgment 
Limitations in California-A New Judi-
cial Approach, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 1 at 
19-23 (1963). See also McGreevy v. 
Constitution Life Ins. Co., 238 Cal. 
CAL LAW 1970 
App.2d 364, 47 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1965), 
affirming $225,000 judgment and fore-
closure of vendor's lien without men-
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specifying therein that the vendor is taking an unsecured 
promissory note for a portion of the purchase price, has been 
recorded. 
"Redemption" is the right afforded junior lien holders to 
protect their interests by paying the full amount secured by 
a prior lien, and the redemption rights are set forth in Civil 
Code sections 2903, 2904, and 2905. If the vendor's lien is 
created at a time when a prior lien is already in existence, 
it appears clear that the holder of the vendor's lien can redeem 
from the prior lien. However, if a vendor's lien is not valid 
against a subsequent encumbrancer in good faith and for 
value, under the provisions of Civil Code section 3048, a ques-
tion arises (and is as yet unanswered) whether the holder 
of a vendor's lien has an interest in the real property (section 
2903) or is the holder of a junior lien (section 2904) as to 
such encumbrancer so as to allow redemption. The above 
question may be raised because a senior lien holder can object 
to an attempted redemption by a person not holding a valid 
lien. lO 
V. Equitable Mortgages 
In James v. P.C.S. Ginning Co./1 the plaintiffs obtained 
financing from the defendant, and executed a promissory note 
secured by a crop mortgage. As additional collateral, the 
plaintiffs executed security agreements and financing state-
ments, which were, in effect, personal property mortgages 
covering farming equipment. Listed along with the equip-
ment was an item that read "Equity in House $10,000." Both 
parties intended the equity in the home to be security for the 
loan. The defendant brought an action on the note as an un-
secured creditor and recovered a personal judgment against 
10. In Lee v. Joseph, 267 Cal. App. 
2d 30, 72 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1968), the 
Court held that when a junior lien hold-
er is seeking redemption, the senior lien 
holder has the defense of the junior 
lien holder's lack of bona fides avail-
able to him. It is therefore arguable 
that under the rule of Lee v. Joseph, a 
436 
senior lien holder could defend redemp-
tion by a holder of a junior vendor's 
lien on the basis of the invalidity of the 
lien. 
11. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 457. For a further discussion of 
this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this 
volume. 
CAL LAW 1970 16
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/14
Secured Transactions 
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed voluntary bankruptcy, claim-
ing their home to be exempt by virtue of a homestead recorded 
after the defendant recorded its financing statements reflecting 
the equity in the home as security for the loan. The court held 
that the parties had created an equitable mortgage, and that 
the defendant, by recovering a personal judgment, had waived 
its equitable mortgage on the home under the "one form of 
action" provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 726. 
VI. "Due On Sale" Clauses 
A "due on sale" clause, commonly found in deeds of trust, 
provides that the beneficiary has the option of declaring all 
sums secured thereby immediately due and payable on a sale 
or transfer of the secured property. 
In Hellbaum v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Assn./2 Lytton's deed 
of trust expressly made applicable a prepayment fee to any 
early payment of the unpaid balance that the debtors might be 
compelled to make under a right of acceleration established 
by the due on sale clause. The Court held that the prepay-
ment fee, coupled with the due on sale clause, was not an in-
valid restraint on alienation. In this case, the plaintiffs had 
a prospective purchaser offering an amount in excess of the 
unpaid principal obligation secured by the Lytton deed of 
trust. Lytton would consent to an assumption without im-
posing its due on sale clause only if the buyers would pay a 
5 % assumption fee. The buyers refused, the sale fell through, 
the plaintiffs then defaulted in their payments to Lytton, and 
a nonjudicial sale was subsequently held. Plaintiffs sued 
for damages in an amount equal to the difference between 
the unpaid balance on the Lytton loan and the amount they 
would have received had the sale gone through. The Court, 
in dictum, mentioned that if the 5 % assumption fee was so 
large as to have no reasonable relationship to the justifiable 
interests of the lender, perhaps a factual question could be 
presented as to whether in effect the restraint was unreason-
12. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 9 (1969). 
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able. However, even if the proposed assumption fee was ex-
tremely large, the invalidity of the fee would, presumably, not 
invalidate Lytton's right to call the loan, leaving the borrower 
in the same position. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' 
arguments of forfeiture and Lytton's alleged duty to permit 
assumption of its deed of trust. 
Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Assn.13 held that there is no 
implied requirement that a lender act "reasonably" in exercis-
ing its option to accelerate on sale or transfer, and that the due 
on sale clause does not constitute an invalid restraint on 
alienation. This case sets forth the business reasons for a 
lender's use of due on sale clauses. One of the most prevalent 
reasons is that the clause permits acceleration on transfer, so 
that the lender may take advantage of rising interest rates 
in the event its borrower transfers the property. 
VII. Subordination and Substitution Clauses 
The plaintiff in Ruth v. Lytton Sav. & Loan Assn. of North-
ern Cal.,14 was the beneficial owner of real property standing 
in the name of defendant title company under a holding agree-
ment. The plaintiff authorized a sale of the property in which 
he anticipated receiving a first deed of trust, and his instruc-
tions provided that his deed of trust could be subordinated 
to deeds of trust for "a construction and/or takeout loan" 
bearing interest of not more than 7.2% per annum, and that 
the amount of said loan was to be limited to a sum no greater 
than 66t % of the total value of both land and buildings 
according to appraisal of the lending institution. Lytton made 
a loan of $620,000, 68.84% of appraised value, bearing in-
terest at 6t%, with a provision that Lytton had the option 
to increase the interest rate by 2 % on default. The downpay-
ment of $40,000 was paid out of the Lytton loan proceeds. 
The defendant title company recorded the Lytton deed of trust 
first and plaintiff's deed of trust second. Default was made 
in payment to Lytton, which then held a nonjudicial sale, wip-
13. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. 14. 266 Cal. App.2d 831, 72 Cal 
Rptr. 135 (1969). Rptr. 521 (1968); modified 272 CA2d 
24,76 Cal. Rptr. 926. 
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ing out plaintiff's second trust deed. The Court held Lytton 
was bona fide encumbrancer for value, taking without knowl-
edge of the above subordination provision, but held the de-
fendant title company liable for negligence in allowing the 
transaction to close, because (a) the "construction loan" did 
not include the $40,000 downpayment, (b) the interest limita-
tion was exceeded, and (c) the amount of the loan exceeded 
66t% of appraised value. The plaintiff recovered the 
amount of his note, interest thereon, costs, and reasonable at-
torneys' fees from defendant title company. 
In Connell v. Zaid/5 the plaintiffs purchased property from 
the defendants' assignors in 1961, and gave them a note se-
cured by a fourth deed of trust, which contained a subordina-
tion clause allowing the plaintiffs to subsequently refinance 
and consolidate the then existing first, second, and third deeds 
of trust, on certain conditions. In August, 1967, the plain-
tiffs desired to refinance the first, second, and third deeds of 
trust, and the defendants refused to execute a subordination 
agreement allowing for the new first deed of trust. The plain-
tiffs commenced an action for specific performance and declar-
atory relief. The trial court sustained a demurrer without 
leave to amend. The reviewing Court distinguished the clause 
in the present case from a conventional "subordination" agree-
ment, stating that the conventional agreement relates to new 
money coming in for development and improvement of the 
land, whereas the clause in this case is one of refinancing with 
respect to encumbrances having priority from the inception 
of the financial arrangements. Substitution and subordination 
are necessarily the same in the sense that each must be founded 
on agreement of the parties. The reviewing court reversed 
the trial court,. sending the matter back for trial in order that 
evidence could be presented as to the meaning of the "subordi-
nation" clause. 
15. 268 Cal. App.2d 788, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 371 (1969). 
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VIII. Release Clauses 
The Court of Appeals, in White Point Co. v. Herrington/6 
refused to grant specific performance of an executory contract 
to purchase real property, because the provisions in the con-
tract relating to partial releases from a purchase-money deed 
of trust referred only to a per acre release price, without de-
scribing the acreage to be released. 
A reviewing Court has for the first time considered the 
effect of an uncertain release clause in a deed of trust executed 
by the purchasers in a consummated sales transaction. In 
Lawrence v. Shutt,17 the plaintiffs purchased property from 
the defendants for $1,280,000-$250,000 in cash and a 
promissory note and deed of trust for $1,030,000. The re-
lease clause in the note allowed for releases of "contiguous" 
acreage, and although the release clauses were not sufficiently 
certain for specific performance, the Court declined to in-
validate the entire transaction because to do so would have 
created an undue hardship on the plaintiffs and because plain-
tiffs agreed during trial to waive the release provisions and 
purchase the property with the blanket deed of trust. As evi-
denced by White Point Co. v. Herrington, supra, the opposite 
result would have occurred if the foregoing transaction was 
only in an executory stage. 
Subordination clauses and release clauses are important 
elements in the development of land. Subordination clauses 
allow the buyer to procure construction and take out loans 
for buildings and improvements to be constructed on the 
property without the burden of having first to pay the full 
purchase price in cash. Release clauses allow development 
on a per lot or per acre basis with the payment of a per unit 
amount on the purchase money note, and again, do not require 
that the full purchase price be paid prior to any release from 
the purchase-money deed of trust. The Courts, however, by 
imposing stringent conditions for the enforceability of sub-
ordination and release clauses, have precluded the effective 
use of the clauses. With respect to subordination clauses, it 
16. 268 Cal. App.2d 458, 73 Cal 17. 269 Cal. App.2d 749, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 885 (1968). Rptr. 533 (1969). 
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appears that setting forth the maximum amount of the prospec-
tive first deed of trust, together with the maximum interest rate 
(leaving all other provisions for agreement between buyer and 
lender), is insufficient unless the buyer also pays a substantial 
part of the purchase price in cash. 
The problem with definitive release clauses is that the devel-
oper, in most instances, desires to have a degree of flexibility 
with respect to the path of development. Also, definitive 
property descriptions for release clauses usually require that 
the property be surveyed and engineered, and as this is an 
expensive process, the buyer usually is not willing to undergo 
such expense prior to purchasing the property. 
It is suggested that many problems involving subordination 
and release clauses in deeds of trust can be minimized or 
eliminated by the use of trusts in the purchase of real property. 
A nondeficiency, unsecured promissory note given to the seller 
for part of the purchase price, coupled with stringent limita-
tions on the trustee's powers of financing and developing the 
purchased property, can give the buyer a greater degree of 
predictability with respect to his purchase, more flexibility in 
the mode and manner of development, and the equivalent of 
section 580b protection. The seller enjoys, in essence, the 
equivalent of a secured position. 
IX. Remedies of Seller Under Land Installment Contracts 
In Gantner v. lohnson/8 Gantner sold real property to John-
son under a land installment contract for the total purchase 
price of $68,500. Johnson made payments for several years 
and then defaulted. Gantner commenced this action to quiet 
title to the property. The Court of Appeals applied the "bene-
fit of the bargain" rule under Civil Code section 3307, as fol-
lows: Gantner had been paid principal of $42,801.24, but 
his damages were $30,500 ($68,500 contract price less $38,-
000 fair market value of the property on the date of the 
breach) plus damage and repair costs of $9,705.56. The 
18. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 381 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 441 
21
Cornblum: Secured Transactions
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Secured Transactions 
total damages were $40,205.65, and, as Johnson had made 
payments of $42,801.24, Gantner was required to pay the de-
fendant (Johnson) $2,595.59. 
The Court relied on Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing 
Corp.,19 which held that when a vendee has materially 
breached his contract, the vendor has an election to rescind 
or to enforce the contract, and if he elects to enforce it, the 
"benefit of the bargain" rule of Civil Code section 3307 is 
applicable. The Court also rejected Johnson's argument that 
the reasonable rental value of the property was the measure of 
damages to be applied where the vendor sought to quiet title 
against a defaulting vendee (Behrendt v. Abraham).20 The 
Court merely noted that the "benefit of the bargain" rule was 
apparently neither raised nor answered in Behrendt. 
In reality, the election is one of measure of damages, and 
not an election to rescind or enforce the contract. The vendor 
will, obviously, elect the measure of damages that affords him 
the greatest recovery. It is unfortunate that the courts do not 
treat land installment contracts in the same manner as mort-
gages and deeds of trust, in which the vendor keeps all pay-
ments made to him by the vendee, and the vendor's remedy 
is to either judicially foreclose or hold a trustee's sale with 
respect to the property. 1 
Under a land installment contract, in the event of breach 
by the purchaser, the best that the vendor can hope for is to 
keep the payments previously made to him, because section 
580b will preclude any deficiency judgment against the de-
faulting vendee. 
19. 64 Cal.2d 801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18, 
415 P.2d 833 (1966). 
20. 64 Cal.2d 182, 49 Cal. Rptr. 292, 
410 P.2d 828 (1966). 
1. It is important to note that Honey 
did not hold Code of Civ. Proc. section 
442 
726 inapplicable to a land installment 
contract, but only that the parties had 
not sought a judicial foreclosure. See 
Hetland, California Real Estate Secure 
Transactions, Cal. CEB Sections 3.67 
through 3.80 (1970). 
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